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DRALLE v. RUDER:* DID THE DECISION CLOSE
THE BOOK ON RECOVERY FOR SOCIETY AND
COMPANIONSHIP IN ILLINOIS OR JUST TURN
THE PAGE?
In the midst of seemingly juggled policy concerns, Illinois courts

have treated suits for loss of society and companionship' in different
and sometimes inconsistent ways.' Most recently, in Dralle v.
* Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988).
1. "Society and companionship" is a term of art that describes the intangible
qualities of the parent-child relationship. Love, Tortious Interference With The Parent-Child Relationship:Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51
IND. L. J. 590, 591 n. 3 (1976). See Sea Land Serv. Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585
(1974) (society includes love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, services and
protection).
2. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984) (parent allowed recovery for loss of society in wrongful death case); Elliot v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d
530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982) (spouse recovered for loss of society and companionship);
Dralle v. Ruder, 148 Ill. App. 3d 961, 500 N.E.2d 514 (1986) (parent allowed recovery
for loss of society resulting from nonfatal injury); Huter v. Ekman, 137 Ill. App. 3d
733, 484 N.E.2d 1224 (1985) (child not allowed to sue for loss of society and companionship); Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984) (parent's
cause of action for loss of society allowed); Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d
400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1982) (parents not allowed to bring a cause of action for loss of
society and companionship).
At least twenty three other states have either explicitly or implicitly denied recognition of a parent's claim for loss of a nonfatally injured child's society. See Martell
v. Boardwalk Enterprises Inc., 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law
society claim denied); Lobianco v. Valley Forge Military Academy, 224 F. Supp. 395
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (denied recovery applying Pennsylvania law); Smith v. Richardson,
277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965) (no parental recovery for loss of society resulting
from child's injuries); Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal. 3d 461,
563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (no recovery for negligently caused loss of
society); Mahoney v. Lensink, 17 Conn. App. 130, 550 A.2d 1088 (1988) (right to consortium from contract of marriage and does not extend to parent-child relationship);
W.J. Bremer Co. Inc., v. Graham, 169 Ga. App. 115, 312 S.E.2d 806 (1983) (implied
recovery limited to spousal actions and not available for parents); Schmeck v. City of
Shawnee, 231 Kan. 588, 647 P.2d 1263 (1982) (rejected child's loss of society claim);
Worsham v. Walker, 498 So.2d 260 (La. App. 1986) (denied parents' recovery in abscence of significant evidence of damage despite fact statute amended to allow claim);
Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. App. 1980) (implied recovery limited to the marital relationship); Schatz v. York Steak House Systems, 51 Md. App. 1045, 444 A.2d
1045 (1982) (denied parents' loss of society claim when daughter raped); Norman v.
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 403 Mass. 303, 529 N.E.2d 139 (1988) (denied parent recovery because not same as spouse); Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 422
N.W.2d 666 (1988) (no recovery, loss of child's society a legislative question); Salin v.
Kloempkin, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982) (implied loss of society recovery limited to
spousal actions); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972) (no loss of society
recovery from daughters accident); Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. App.
1986) (implied parents may only recover monetary loss); Siciliano v. Capital City
Shows Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984) (policy prevents parental loss of society
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Ruder,' the Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize a cause of
action for a parent's loss of society and companionship resulting
from a nonfatal injury to a child." Because a parent's cause of action
was unnecessary and lacked legislative support, the court properly
limited tort liabilty. In doing so, however, the court tainted its decision with inconsistent reasoning. Additionally, the scope of the opinion was narrow
and thus did not thoroughly resolve this controver5
sial issue.

The events leading to the Dralle litigation began October 17,
1977, when Karen Dralle gave birth to Jeffrey Dralle.6 During the
delivery, Jeffrey suffered anoxia" and was in fetal distress.8 Consequently, the child was born with a number of serious disorders.' The
plaintiffs claimed Jeffrey's injuries were the result of Karen Dralle's
action); Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (no paren-

tal loss of filial consortium recovery); Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v.
Neal, 194 N.C. 401, 139 S.E. 841 (1927) (denied mother's loss of comfort claim); Independent School Dist. 129 v. Craw, 688 P.2d 1291 (Okla. 1984) (implied parent may
only recover monetary damages); Beerbower v. State ex rel. Oregon Health Sciences
University, 85 Or. App. 330, 736 P.2d 596 (1987) (parent's have no right to compensation for loss of society and companionship); McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902) (parental loss of society damages not
awarded); Jannette v. Deprez, 701 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (loss of society
recovery requires parent witness injury); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo.
1986) (parents have no cause of action for loss of companionship).
In contrast, ten states have recognized causes of action for parents. See Reben v.
Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 705 P.2d 1360 (1985) (parents have cause of action for loss of
consortium when child injured); Miller v. Subia, 514 P.2d 79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973)
(by implication recovery may be permitted); Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla.
1973) (either parent has loss of society cause of action when child injured); Hayward
v. Yost, 242 P.2d 971 (Idaho 1952) (parent's recovery includes loss of society and
companionship); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (interpreted Iowa survival statute); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Medical Center 228 N.J. Super. 17, 548 A.2d
528 (1988) (parent's "per quod" claim for loss of society recognized); First Trust Co.
v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988) (negligence action citing Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984)); Norvelle
v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 11 Ohio App. 3d 70, 463 N.E.2d 111 (1983) (parents of
injured child may recover for loss of society); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103
Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190 (1984) (child's claim joined with parent's claim); Korth
by Lukas v. American Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983) (parents may recover loss of society).
3. 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988).
4. Id. at 71, 529 N.E.2d at 213-214.
5. For a discussion of why the loss of society issue is not completely resolved,
see infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
6. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 63, 529 N.E.2d at 209.
7. Anoxia is the absence of or a reduced oxygen supply. R. SLOANE, THE
SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY

39 (1987).

8.. Fetal distress is difficult or labored breathing with accompanying bluish discoloration of the skin. Id. at 694. The condition most frequently occurs in premature
infants, children of diabetic mothers, infants delivered by a cesarean section and
sometimes with no apparent predisposing cause. Id.
9. The plaintiffs alleged that the child suffered brain damage and was born deformed. Dralle v. Ruder, 148 Ill. App. 3d 961, 962, 500 N.E.2d 514, 515 (1986).
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ingestion of Merrell-Dow's prescription drug Bendectin 0 during her
pregnancy."
The complaint," in addition to Jeffrey's claim for his own injuries, sought parental recovery for loss of society and companionship
resulting from the child's injuries.' 3 The defendant, Merrell-Dow,
moved for dismissal of the parental claims for recovery contending
that Illinois did not recognize a cause of action for the parents'
claims."'
10. Bendectin is an antinausea drug. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1239 (35th
ed. 1981). Merrell-Dow marketed the drug in the United States between 1957 and
1983. 400 Suits Against Drug Firm to Be Heard by I Jury, L.A. Times, June 11, 1984
1, at 3, col. 4. It was the only Food and Drug Administration approved prescription
drug available for the treatment of nausea during pregnancy. Id. Over thirty million
women have taken the drug. Id.
11. Merrell-Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, denied that the drug caused
the injuries. Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant at 27, Dralle v. Ruder, 124
Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988) (No. 64424). There have been a tremendous number
of complaints filed claiming the drug causes birth defects. See In re Bendectin Prods.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussing the massive number of suits
involving Bendectin litigation); In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239
(1984) (noting size of the Bendectin litigation). As of October 1987, Merrell-Dow has
been involved in 17 trials involving Bendectin. Dow Chemical Unit Loses Round in
Suit over Birth Defects, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1987, at 34, col. 6. Of these 17 trials, 13
have resulted in verdicts or judgments in favor of Merrell-Dow, and over 300 remain
pending. Id. See also Kolata, Jury Clears Bendectin, 227 SCIENCE 1559 (1985) (discussing the Bendectin trials); Kolata, FDA to Reexamine Bendectin Data, 217 ScIENcE 335 (1982) (noting link between results of Bendectin testing on laboratory animals and the filing of law suits). For a general discussion of possible solutions to mass
tort problems like the Bendectin litigation, see Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987).
12. Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 63-64, 529 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1988). The four
part complaint named two physicians, a medical center and Merrell-Dow the manufacturer of Bendectin as defendants. Id. The complaint was premised on both product liability and negligence theories. Id. Counts one and two were negligence actions
brought by Jeffrey Dralle and his parents respectively. Id. Counts three and four were
product liability actions also by Jeffrey and his parents respectively. Id.
13. Id.
14. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 64, 529 N.E.2d at 210. Merrell-Dow also contended
that damages for loss of society and companionship are not recoverable in a product
liability action. Id. at 74, 529 N.E.2d at 215. The supreme court did not address this
contention because the result in the loss of society and companionship issue mooted
the product liability issue. Id. The court, however, cited without explanation Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983). Id. The
Hammond case affirmed a spousal claim for loss of consortium in a products liability
action. Hammond, 97 Ill. 2d 195, 459 N.E.2d 210 (1983). The reason for the court's
reference to the Hammond case is not clear because the question, whether damages
for loss of society and companionship are recoverable in a products liability action,
was not at issue in Hammond. See Hammond, 97 Ill. 2d at 199, 454 N.E.2d at 213
(main issue concerned whether the statute of limitations barred the action).
Recovery in strict liability requires physical harm to plaintiff's person or property. Woodhill v. Parke Davis and Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683, 688
(1978), aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 38, 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1) (1965) (seller of a product is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the product). In his concurring opinion, Justice Clark asserted that the claim should have been dismissed on strict liability grounds. Dralle,
124 Ill. 2d at 74-75, 529 N.E.2d at 215 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark reasoned
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The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the parents'
claims.1" The parents then appealed from the dismissal order 16 and
the appellate court reversed the trial court decision. 17 The appellate
court reasoned that because a parent may recover for loss of a
child's society and companionship in a wrongful death" action, it
would be anomalous to deny recovery in a nonfatal injury action."
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the defendant's petition for
leave to appeal20 to resolve the conflict among the lower courts involving the applicability of case precedent in this area.2 The court
addressed the issue of whether Illinois recognizes a cause of action
for the loss of a child's society and companionship resulting from a
nonfatal injury.2 2 The court concluded that nonfatal injuries receive
sufficient compensation and held that policy considerations necessitated limiting the extension of tort liability for loss of society and
companionship.2 3 4Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate
court's judgment.2
In deciding whether to recognize a cause of action for loss of
society and companionship, the Dralle court first referred to the apthat one may only recover for physical harm to his person or property; and loss of
society and companionship did not constitute physical harm. Id. Therefore, Justice
Clark concluded that the claim did not state a cause of action. Id.
Uncertainty in this situation may arise because courts have termed claims for
loss of society and companionship as derivative actions. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §125, at 935-39

(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter

PROSSER AND KEETON].

Derivative actions, however, are

actions brought by a plaintiff to redress a wrong done to another. C.. Bonde v. Stern,
73 N.D. 273, 283, 14 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1944) (action not derivative when brought on
plaintiff's own behalf). Although loss of society actions may derive from the same fact
situation as the physically injured parties' action, the claims are legally distinct.
Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 Ill. 2d 159, 163, 317 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1974). Therefore, loss of society claims logically do not state a cause of action in products liability
when they are based on the physical injury to another. See Woodhill, 79 Ill. 2d at 38,
402 N.E.2d at 200 (injured party cannot sue for emotional distress in products liability actions); Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784, 455 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1983)
(mental anguish and emotional distress without accompanying physical injury not
compensable in strict liability); cf. Walters v. Mintec Int'l 758 F.2d 73, 79 (1985)
(court concluded plaintiff may recover for physical harm resulting from emotional
disturbance); see generally Love, supra note 1, at 628-32 (discussing the difference
between derivative and independent actions).
15. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 63, 529 N.E.2d at 209.
16. Dralle v. Ruder, 113 Ill. 2d 573, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1987).
17. Dralle v. Ruder, 148 111.App. 3d 961, 964, 500 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1986).
18. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (1984)
(holding that parents are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of pecuniary injury for
loss of a child's society and companionship).
19. Dralle, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 500 N.E.2d at 516.
20. Dralle v. Ruder, 113 Ill. 2d 573, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1987).
21. For examples of the differing treatment afforded to recovery for loss of society claims in general, see supra note 2.
22. Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 64, 529 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1988).
23. Id. at 71, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
24. Id. at 74, 529 N.E.2d at 215.
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pellate court's reliance on Bullard v. Barnes.2 5 In Bullard, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a parent's right to recover for the
loss of a deceased child.2 6 The Bullard court concluded that earlier
cases allowed similar recovery and that allowing parental recovery
was consistent with the expanded recovery trend in wrongful death
27
cases.
The Dralle court, however, concluded that the Bullard decision
did not support a claim for nonfatal injuries. 28 In support of this
conclusion, the court distinguished wrongful death actions from
nonfatal injury actions on the basis that only surviving family members can sue in a wrongful death action. 9 Illinois enacted the
Wrongful Death Act in 1853 to allow the recovery of the value of the
child's contribution to the family income.30 Today, however, the
only injury that families usually incur is loss of society." Thus, the
court concluded that recognition of a cause of action for loss of society in wrongful death actions was necessary to compensate for the
death. " Conversely, the court observed that a nonfatally injured victim retains his own cause of action.33 Because injured parties can
sue on their own behalf, the court found parental causes of action
34
unnecessary.
In addition to the fact that nonfatally injured victims can bring
their own suit, the court asserted policy considerations in support of
its decision.3 5 The court's first policy concern was the need to limit
25. Id. at 65, 529 N.E.2d at 211.
26. Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984).
27. Id. at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233. The Bullard court noted that when enacted,
the Wrongful Death Act reflected the social values of the time. Id. The court then
stated that today the presumption of pecuniary injury is no longer the loss of a child's
earnings; rather it is the loss of a child's society. Id. at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234. For a
discussion of the history of the Wrongful Death Act, see infra note 67.
28. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69, 529 N.E.2d at 212.
29. Id. at 69, 529 N.E.2d at 212. For further discussion of the distinction between a wrongful death cause of action and a nonfatal injury cause of action, see infra
note 65 and accompanying text.
30. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 515, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (1984)
(parents could only recover for loss of child's income).
31. See Hinton v. Hinton, 436 F.2d 211, 213 (1970) (parent's loss is the loss of
family relations).
32. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69, 529 N.E.2d at 212. See Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 516,
468 N.E.2d at 1233 (stating that in modern family life children do not provide significant financial benefits to their parents); McClung, The Value of A Child, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 118 (1973) (advocating recovery for loss of society and companionship because
children no longer provide financial support to families).
33. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69, 529 N.E.2d at 212. For further discussion of the
nonfatal injury distinction, see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
34. Id. See Comment, Negligent Injury To Family Relationships: A Reevaluation of The Logic of Liability, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 794, 810-13 (1983) (discussing compensation as basis for loss of consortium actions).
35. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69-71, 529 N.E.2d at 213-14. See Love, supra note 1, at
595-605 (discussing various policy considerations involved).
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tort liability to a controllable degree. 6 The court reasoned that allowing a parental cause of action would lead to grandparents, siblings, and friends bringing claims. 37 Consequently, the court concluded that a loss of society and companionship theory of recovery
could lead to unlimited liability.3"
The court next examined the problems associated with assessing damages for loss of society and companionship. 9 In particular,
the court feared that tortfeasors might end up overcompensating the
injured parties.40 The court reasoned that the parents' claims and
the child's claim, though legally distinct, were factually similar and
difficult to distinguish.4 ' The court concluded that the likelihood of
double recovery weighed against recognizing the parents' claims.4 2
In connection with the damage assessment problems, the court
considered the necessity of evaluating the diminution in value of a
child's society and companionship an undesirable task.4 3 The court
reasoned that the open courtroom is not a suitable place for parents
36. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69-70, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
37. Id. at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213. See Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 572,
414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1980) (discussing the possible consequences involved with recognizing the action); See also Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202, 447
N.E.2d 384, 390 (1983), which stated that "[elvery injury has ramifying consequences,
like the rippling[s] of the water, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree." Id. at 202, 447 N.E.2d at 390
(quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 554, 561, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1969)).
38. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213. The need to prevent limitless
liability in the area of family relations has been asserted by Illinois and other courts
when denying claims. See Baxter v. Superior, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 464-65, 563 P.2d 871,
873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317 (1977) (defendants' liability increases with each claim
instituted by family members); Borer v. American Airlines Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 449,
563 P.2d 858, 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307-08 (1977) (asserting that claims by each
family member multiplies liability of defendant); Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 203, 447
N.E.2d at 390 (rejecting contention that tortfeasor liable for all costs to plaintiff);
Koskela v. Martin, 91111. App. 3d 568, 572, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (1980) (stating that
not every loss is compensable and courts must locate line where liability terminates).
But see Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 233, 722 P.2d 955, 960 (1986) (court is
responsible for dealing with suits on merits irrespective of number of suits imagined
when engaging in gloomy speculation).
39. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
40. Id. The court stated that the assessment of damages posed undeniably difficult problems for the trier of fact. Id. at 70-71, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
41. Id. at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213. See Baxter, 19 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 563 P.2d at
873, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (asserting danger of double recovery if multiple claims not
distinguished); Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (advocating that having jury distinguish parents' claim from child's claim may be asking
too much). But see Brown v. Metzger, 104 Ill. 2d 30, 35, 470 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1984)
(double recovery problem solved by joinder); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 426-27,
170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960) (double recovery a cliche for denying recovery).
42. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
43. Id. at 70-71, 529 N.E.2d at 213. The court illustrated the paradox of the
situation by stating that in such circumstances parents must minimize their child's
value while the defendant shows the greater family bonds arising from the injuries.
Id.
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to disparage their own child's value." The court contrasted this situation with wrongful death actions which presume injury.' Consequently, the court concluded that interests in maintaining family re46
lations dissuade allowing the parents' claims.
After declaring that policy considerations weigh against recognizing the parents' causes of action, the Drale court acknowledged
that a spouse may bring an action for loss of consortium 47 when the
other spouse is nonfatally injured.' The court, however, attempted
to reconcile the different treatment of these two conceptually similar
fact situations. In doing so, the court set forth a list of attributes
found in a spousal relationship: material services, elements of companionship, felicity, sexual intercourse and the fact that marriage is
a basic human right.' 9 The court then concluded that many of those
attributes are not found in a parent-child relationship.50 On this basis, the court rejected spousal consortium actions as a basis for recognizing a cause of action in a case involving a nonfatally injured

child. 51
44. For a discussion of the applicability of the court's degradation argument,
see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
45. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 71, 529 N.E.2d at 213. See also Bullard v. Barnes, 102
Ill. 2d 505, 507, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (1984) (parents entitled to presumption of
pecuniary injury under wrongful death statute).
46. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 71, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
47. Id. at 71-72, 529 N.E.2d at 214. For a comparison of different interpretations of the term consortium, see infra note 50.
48. Id. See also Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 427, 170 N.E.2d 881, 893 (1960)
(wife maintained loss of consortium action after husband negligently injured).
49. DraUe, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214.
50. Id. The court did not specify which attributes were missing from the parent-child relationship that were present in the spousal relationship. Id. at 78, 529
N.E.2d at 216-17 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark asserted that sexual intercourse was the one key missing attribute in the parent-child relationship. Id. at 78,
529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J., concurring). Courts generally maintain that there is a
distinction between spousal consortium and loss of society and companionship. See
Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302,
307 (1977) (spousal consortium different because claim rests on impairment of sexual
life of couples); see also Brown v. Metzger, 104 Ill. 2d 30, 34, 470 N.E.2d 302, 304
(1984) (stating that consortium encompasses loss of support and society including
companionship amd sexual intercourse); Elliot v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 530, 535, 442
N.E.2d 163, 165 (1982) (consortium unique to spousal relationship and includes society, guidance, companionship, felicity and sexual relations); Mitchell v. White Motor
Co., 58 Ill. 2d 159, 162, 317 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1974) (asserting that spousal relationship
is contractually injured); Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 572, 414 N.E.2d 1148,
1151 (1980) (consortium dealt with destruction of sexual life and does not exist in a
child's action); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 14, at 931 (historically consortium
meant spouses services, sexual relationships, companionship and society); Love, supra
note 1, at 613-615 (asserting that the only significant difference is sexual relations).
But see Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644
(1975) (consortium no longer limited to a spouse; includes loss of any family member); Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 78, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J., concurring) (no important
difference between spousal loss and parental loss); Berger v. Weber, 82 Mich. App.
199, 209, 267 N.W.2d 124, 130 (1981) (other elements also deserving of protection).
51. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214. In its analysis, the court stated
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Upon reaching its conclusion, the Dralle court limited the scope
of its opinion to cases involving indirect52 or negligent interference
with the parent-child relationship. 2 The court recognized that Illinois appellate courts differed in their decisions whether to permit
recovery for parental loss of society in direct 4 or intentional nonfatal interference suits.55 The court stated, however, that the type of
harm in the direct interference cases involved a different basis for
recovery." Therefore, the court did not consider the nature or ex7
tent of recovery for a direct interference in the Dralle decision.

In Dralle, the Illinois Supreme Court justifiably affirmed the
dismissal of the parents' causes of action for loss of society and companionship. The decision was correct for three reasons. First, in a
nonfatal injury case the injured child has a cause of action so a parental action is unnecessary.58 Second, the need to limit tort liability
to a controllable degree outweighs reasons for recognizing the new
cause of action.59 Finally, there is no legislative support for a parental cause of action."0
The court's opinion, however, falls short in three respects. First,
the court's attempt to distinguish spousal actions from parental acthat spousal consortium draws its primary animation from the marriage relationship,
a basic human right which is fundamental to our existence and survival. Id. Justice
Clark, in response to this statement, contended that it was "late in the day" to deny
that a parent has a fundamental right to companionship and care of her children. Id.
at 78, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark J., concurring). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982) (parents have fundamental liberty interest in care and custody of
child).
52. An indirect interference occurs when companionship and affection are interferred with through physical injury to a family member. PROSSER AND KEETON
supra note 14, at 916.
53. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214.
54. A direct interference is an act by the defendant with the intent to disrupt a
relationship. Id. Examples of this direct interference include abduction, criminal conversation, seduction or alienation of affections. PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 14,
at 924-30.
55. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 73, 529 N.E.2d at 214. See Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F.
Supp. 679, 682-83 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (asserting that Illinois would recognize direct interference action for parental loss of a child's society); Dymek v. Nyqust, 128 Ill. App.
3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984) (loss of child's society claim involving a direct interference maintained). But see Whitehorse v. Critchfield, 144 Ill. App. 3d 192, 494 N.E.2d
743 (1986) (court denied claim in lieu of further legislative action). For commentaries
which assert that family relations deserve protection against both negligent and intentional acts, see Comment, Loss of Consortium-Child'sAction For, 2 J. FAM. L. 51,
53-54 (1962); Comment, Torts: Right of Child to Recover Against Negligent Third
Party for loss of Mother's Aid and Comfort, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 500, 502 (1953).
56. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 73, 529 N.E.2d at 214. For a comparison of the difference between direct and indirect interference, see supra notes 52 and 54.
57. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214. For an example of recovery for
loss of society arising from a direct interference with a parent-child relationship, see
Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984).
58. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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tions is not rational or consistent with the overall reasoning of the
court's opinion.6 1 Second, the court limited the scope of the opinion
and did not clarify whether it would recognize other similar suits.2
Last, the policy argument based on damage assessment problems,
which the court asserted for the non-recognition of the cause of action, applies equally to wrongful death and spousal actions where
the court has previously rejected the argument.6 s Consequently,
these shortcomings weaken the persuasiveness of the court's
reasoning.
The court's approach to distinguishing claims under the Wrongful Death Act from nonfatal injury claims focused on requiring defendants to provide safeguards against reasonable risks of injury. 4
Both fatal and nonfatal injuries result in genuine loss of society and
companionship. 5 An injured person, however, may bring suit for all
his injuries, including any loss of society and companionship he
suffers.66
In contrast, before the Illinois Supreme Court recognized loss of
society claims under the Wrongful Death Act, family members could
only sue for economic damages resulting from death to another.6 7
Under the Wrongful Death Act, this resulted in the intolerable para61. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
63. Dra~le, 124 Ill. 2d at 80, 529 N.E.2d at 218 (Clark, J., concurring) (stating
that majority resurrected argument it previously rejected). For a list of those cases
where the court has rejected damage assessment problems as a basis for denying recovery, see supra note 41.
64. Id. at 69, 529 N.E.2d at 212. The Dralle court reasoned that safeguarding
against the parents' injury was not reasonable in light of the fact that defendant must
also safeguard against the child's injuries. Id.
65. A plausible reason for a court to distinguish between fatal and nonfatal injuries is that in death claims genuineness is certain. See Love, supra note 1, at 612
(asserting that some courts implicitly conclude the reason for distinguishing is that
death claims are certain to be genuine).
66. Cf. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 14, at 368 (in every jurisdiction child
may maintain action for consequences of prenatal injuries).
67. Illinois patterned its Wrongful Death Act after what is commonly known as
Lord Campbell's Act of 1846. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 1, (Smith-Hurd 1959) (Historical Note). Cases first interpreting Lord Campbell's Act found that parents could only
recover for actual loss of a child's income. Duckworth v. Johnson, 157 Eng. Rep. 997
(1859) Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852). Illinois adopted
this common law rule when it enacted the statute. Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505,
515, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (1984).
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act states:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal
represenatives of such deceased person and, except as otherwise hereinafter
provided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person and in
every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and
just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1987).
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dox that it was better to kill someone than injure him."s Therefore,
ensuring tortfeasors are liable for their actions required that courts
allow next of kin to recover for the loss of society and companionship resulting from death.6 9
A defendant must compensate nonfatal injuries that are the direct result of his actions. 70 In this way the defendant is responsible
for providing safeguards against injury to others.7 1 Therefore, the
distinction between wrongful death actions and nonfatal injury actions is rational and consistent with certain notions of social justice
72
and policy.
The next consideration that supports the court's decision is the
need to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. Recovery for loss of society and companionship resulting from
nonfatal injuries can create additional suits by family members. A
child's injuries affect his parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters,
aunts, uncles and cousins.72 Because wrongful conduct can affect so
many people, limiting the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree is necessary.74 As a result, courts must find a compromise that protects not only plaintiffs, but defendants as well. 5
The rational place to draw the line in loss of society claims,
where the injured parties have a cause of action themselves, is at the
direct injury.76 Because the direct injury receives compensation,
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
69. See Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill.
2d 107, 120, 499 N.E.2d 1373,
1379 (1986) (court allowed recovery for loss of society in death of adult child); Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (1984) (court allowed parental recovery for death of minor child); Elliot v. Willis 92 Ill. 2d 530, 541, 442
N.E.2d 163, 168 (1982) (court allowed spousal recovery for loss of society resulting
from death).
70. A physically injured person can recover for loss of society that is a result of
the injury. PROSSER AND KEETON supra note 14, at 368.
71. Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 69, 529 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1988).
72. See Russel v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972) (must
consider overall policy when deciding whether common law change justified).
73. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
74. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 203, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1983).
75. Some courts have relied upon the elements of duty and causation and the
need to limit those elements. See Borer v. American Airlines Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446,
563 P.2d 858, 861, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) (court concluded limiting legal causation to manageable degree required denying a loss of society claim to injured parents' children); Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 572, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151
(1980) (requiring that defendant be responsible for all losses experienced by every
other person places unreasonable burden on society); De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 58 N.Y. 2d 1053, 1055, 449 N.E.2d 406, 407 (1983) (children denied claim for
loss of society because of need to limit duty owed by defendant). See also PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971) (requiring defendant pay for all losses
places unreasonable burden on defendant).
76. Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill.
App. 3d 568, 572, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1980).
While declining to allow a child to recover for the loss of society and companionship
of her father, the Koskela court stated that "[iut may be difficult for courts to draw
the line to end litigation if all members of the household such as cousins, grandchil-

68.
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practical considerations of limiting liability outweigh the need to insure that the defendant is held liable for all the consequences of his
actions. 7 7 Consequently, family recovery for loss of society and companionship resulting from nonfatal injuries to another is neither a
necessary or logical extension of tort liability.
Another reason for refusing to extend liability is that there is no
legislative support for a parental cause of action. The Illinois legislature recently acted to limit tort liability.7 s Denying parental claims
for loss of society when children suffer nonfatal injuries is consistent
with the policies of this recent legislation. 9 Additionally, the legislature generally is in a better position to weigh the merits of expanding recovery against other considerations.8 " The legislature, as
it did with the Wrongful Death Act, can establish who may recover
and place limits circumscribing the available remedy.81 Because legislative action is the appropriate means for expansion of liability in
this area, the legislative attempts to limit tort recovery support the
refusal to recognize a parental cause of action for loss of society.82
Although the court's decision was justified, the court's reasoning
was strained in its analysis of spousal consortium actions. The
Dralle court distinguished spousal recovery for loss of society and
companionship from the parent-child situation on the basis that the
parent-child relationship lacks many of the attributes of the spousal
relationship.8 s As Chief Justice Clark pointed out in his concurring
opinion, the only element of companionship attributable to a
dren and foster children could have potential claims for loss of consortium." Id.
77. See Id. at 572, 414 N.E.2d at 1151 (holding defendant responsible for every
other person places unreasonable burden on all human activity).
78. In 1986, the Illinois legislature enacted by omnibus legislation what is commonly known as The Tort Reform Act. See LAWS OF ILLINOIS, EIGHTY-FouRTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1986 SESSION, vol. 2 at 3740. (public act 84-1431). See also Mulgrew,
Strict Tort Products Liability In Illinois - An Updated Exposition, 76 ILL. B.J. 854,
855 (1987) (states that tort reform was recently enacted).
79. These reform bills targeted two areas. Articles one through seven were
aimed at cutting down the number of lawsuits in Illinois. EIGHTY-FOURTH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF ILLINOIS, SENATE DEBATES, at 80 (June 30, 1986). Articles eight through
twenty six were aimed at regulating the insurance industry. Id.
80. Block v. Pielet Bros. Scrap and Metal, 119 Ill. App. 3d 983, 987, 457 N.E.2d
509, 512 (1983). See Huter v. Ekman, 137 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735, 484 N.E.2d 1224, 1226
(1985) (stating that expansion should be left to legislature); Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill.
App. 3d 568, 570, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1980) (determination whether to grant
child's cause of action is legislative decision).
81. Block, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 987, 457 N.E.2d at 512. The Block court stated
that the legislature can better evaluate the merits of recovery against problems of
duplicate recovery, increased litigation, remoteness of damages and adverse affects on
the family. Id.
82. See infra note 106 for state statutes which create a cause of action for loss
of society.
83. The court, however, did not specify which attributes were lacking in the
parent-child relationship. Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 72, 529 N.E.2d 209, 214
(1988).
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spousal relationship that is lacking in a parent-child situation is sexual intercourse.84 Justice Clark stated that although the factual distinction exists, it does not compel the conclusion that spousal actions should be treated differently.8 5 Sexual relations are but one
element of the spousal consortium action. 6 Adding sex to the other
elements of the relationship does not necessarily make the relation-

ship more deserving of protection. 7
The distinction is even more illogical when considering the fact
that one may partially lose companionship of a spouse and still be
able to enjoy sexual intercourse with that spouse. 8 The court has
not stated that a spouse can only sue if the ability to have sexual
intercourse is lost.88 Further, Illinois does not distinguish spousal recovery from parent-child recovery under the Wrongful Death Act."
Not only is the court's treatment of a spousal action illogical, it
is also inconsistent with the court's policy considerations in Dralle.9 '
When the injured spouse retains a cause of action, there is still substantially the same possibility of multiple recovery.9 2 Damages are
not recognizably less difficult to calculate either.8 3 Consequently, if
84. Id. at 78, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark J., concurring).
85. Id. at 76, 529 N.E.2d at 216 (Clark J., concurring). Justice Clark stated "a
difference which makes no difference is no difference." Id.
86. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 427, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960) (consortium encompasses services, companionship, felicity and sexual intercourse).
87. See Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 79, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark J., concurring) (injury
to child no less than injury to spouse).
88. If a spouse sues for loss of consortium and part of her damages relate to
sexual intercourse, then sex is a factor. See Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 427, 170 N.E.2d at 891
(wife's action not merely for loss of support but other elements as well which include
sex). However, if the spouse does not claim impaired sexual relations, and rather
claims the other elements of consortium, then theoretically sex would not be a factor
in the suit. See Brown v. Metzger, 104 Ill. 2d 30, 34, 470 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1984) (loss
of support and loss of society two elements of consortium). But see Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 44, 101 N.W.2d 227, 232 (1960) (consortium cannot be broken
down into component parts).
89. The Illinois Supreme Court has previously stated that an estranged spouse
can be joined in a husband's action for damages. See Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 35, 470
N.E.2d at 304. Although the Metzger court implied that a spouse may still recover
even if sex is not a factor, the Dralle court, in stating that the elements of consortium
are all welded into a conceptualistic unity, implied that the elements cannot be considered separately. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214.
90. The Wrongful Death Act states that the surviving spouse and next of kin
may sue for wrongful deaths. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 67.
91. For a discussion of the policy concerns espoused by the Dralle court, see
supra text accompanying notes 35-46.
92. But cf. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 80, 529 N.E.2d at 218 (Clark, J., concurring).
Justice Clark stated that even if the problem of multiple recovery existed, careful
jury instructions would prevent multiple recovery. Id.
93. Compare Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 409, 440 N.E.2d
942, 948 (1982) (loss of society an intangible injury not readily quantifiable in damages) with Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) (courts permit money damages for intangible loss of
spousal consortium).
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Illinois denies a parent-child cause of action, the state should deny a
spousal cause of action.
In addition to the inconsistent treatment of spousal actions, the
majority opinion has ambiguous implications. The court limited its
holding to the facts of the case and implicitly did not address the
closely connected issue of whether the Dralle holding extends to situations where the child, already living, is subsequently nonfatally
injured. 4 In those situations there is a pre-existing relationship
which helps determine the value of the loss. 5 Therefore, the court
may decide that the loss is easier to calculate.96 Because the calculation is easier, the court may find such a relationship similar to a
spousal relationship.97 If so, there may be enough attributes present
for the court to find the injury compensable.
Finally, the court's policy arguments based on damage assessment problems are unpersuasive. Duplicate recovery, because of the
difficulty in distinguishing the parents' claims from the child's
claim, is a relevant concern.' However, because this same court has
overcome these problems, 99 the arguments are not appropriate and
94. See Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72, 529 N.E.2d at 214 ("companionship and society
for which recovery is sought here is not identical with the spousal claim recognized in
Dini").
95. See Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 Ill. 2d 482, 489, 499 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1986)
(compensatory damages calculated by comparing injured state with condition plaintiff would be in without injury). But see Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 233,
722 P.2d 955, 960 (1986) (filial relationship ill-served by arbitrary age distinction).
1 96. Prior to Dralle, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a wrongful life claim
because it did not think a meaningful comparison of the infant's injured state and
what the infant's condition would have been without the injury could be made.
Goldberg, 113 Ill. 2d at 489, 499 N.E.2d at 409. This theory that damages are too
speculative was forcibly argued by the defendants in Dralle. See Appellant's Opening
Brief at 27-28, Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (No. 64424) (1988).
97. An Arizona court recognized a cause of action for an adult child. Frank v.
Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986). Arizona, however, had previously
recognized recovery for injury to minor children. See Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 310,
705 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (parents may sue for loss of consortium of
injured child). In Frank, the court concluded that there was no reason to limit recovery to parents of minor children when parents of adult children may suffer equal or
greater harm. Frank, 150 Ariz. at 234, 722 P.2d at 961 (emphasis added). Since the
Frank court relied on the Reben case, it does not appear that the Frank court considered the minor and adult situations distinguishably different. The Frank case, however, may imply that as the child gets older a more valuable relationship develops
between the parent and child.
98. See Comment, The Parental Claim For Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting From The Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposalfor Arizona, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 924-26 (advocating that multiple recovery is a relevant concern but
can be reasonably limited).
99. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 518, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (1984)
(jury can assign dollar value for loss of society); Elliot v. Willis, 92 Ill. 2d 530, 540,
442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1982) (jury capable of putting monetary value on loss of consortium); Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 31, 147 N.E.2d 352, 355 (1958) (jury may give
damages as they deem fair and just compensation).
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reduce the persuasiveness of the opinion. 0 0
In connection with the damage assessment problem, the court's
concern about parents degrading their children is misplaced." 1 The
parents of a child that suffers an ordinary prenatal injury contend

that the child means very much to them. 02 The parents then assert
that, like any injured person, they deserve compensation for the
damage done to the parent-child
relationship.' 08 Therefore, the
04
child's value is not degraded.'
The Dralle decision represents the court's determination to
limit expansion of tort liability in the controversial area of family
relations. The ruling undoubtedly will have a significant impact on
future loss of society and companionship litigation. 0 5 Barring legis100. Difficulty in calculating damages is not a reason for denying recovery for
harm. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
See Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care And Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. 722, 732 (1976)
(court is responsible for dealing with suits on their merits).
101. The argument against parents disparaging their children in court is characteristically found in wrongful birth and wrongful life cases. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 202, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1983) (wrongful birth case asserting
that courtroom is not suitable place for parents to disparage their child's value).
Wrongful birth and wrongful life cases are different from the ordinary prenatal injury
such as that found in Dralle. In Dralle, the assertion is that if the defendant was not
negligent, the child would have been born healthy. Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61, 63,
529 N.E.2d 209, 210 (1988). In contrast, wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
claim that if not for the defendant, the child would would not have been born at all.
See Siemienic v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (wrongful life suit premised on idea that not being born is better than than having an impaired existence); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 Ill. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986) (suit
premised on claim that child better off if not born at all). For a general discussion of
claims involving wrongful birth and wrongful life, see Trotzig, The Defective Child
and the Actions for Wrongful Life And Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15-17 (1980);
Note, Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Pregnancy in Illinois, 15 Loy. U.
Cm. L.J. 799 (1984).
102. Prenatal injuries can be classified into two categories: 1) tortious infliction
of a physical injury upon an unborn child; and 2) tortious acts or ommissions which
result in birth of an unwanted child. PROSSER AN KEETON, supra note 14, at 367. The
first category is an ordinary prenatal injury and the latter category is commonly
known as a wrongful birth. Id.
103. See supra note 101.
104. For a contrary view see Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131,
691 P.2d 190 (1984) (Dore J., dissenting).
105. See Barkei v. Delnor Hosp., 176 Ill. App. 3d 681, 531 N.E.2d 413 (1988)
(parents denied recovery for loss of society and companionship). But cf. Hutson v.
Bell, 702 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Hutson, the plaintiff's son was allegedly
shot in the head after being taken into custody. The parent's sued under the federal
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, for deprivation of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in her son's continued society. The federal district court declined to
follow Illinois law and recognized the parental cause of action for loss of society and
companionship resulting from non-fatal injuries to a child. Hutson, 702 F. Supp. at
214. The district court reasoned that the Supreme Court considered a parent's right
to society and companionship a fundamental right. Id. at 213. The fourteenth amendment protects the parent's interest regardless of whether the child is fatally or
nonfatally injured. Id. at 214. Therefore, the court found the Dralle decision inconsis-
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lative action, it is now clear that in Illinois parents may only recover
for loss of society and companionship in wrongful death actions and
probably direct interference actions.'0 6 Unfortunately, the Dralle
opinion not only has ambiguous implications with regard to children
already living, it also is inconsistent with Illinois' treatment of
spousal actions. Although reconciliation of this inconsistent treatment will require legislative action, resolution of direct interference
and pre-existing children issues may be the next page written in this
controversial area.
Frank I. Powers

tent with the policy which supports a cause of action under Section 1983. Id. at 214.
106. At least five states provide for a parent's cause of action by statute. See
IDAHO CODE § 5-310 (1979) (interpreted in Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d
971 (1952); IOWA R.C.P. 8 (stating that parents may sue for actual loss of services
resulting from injury or death to a minor child); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West
Supp. 1989) (recovery for loss of society allowed in wrongful death and nonfatal injury actions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04 (1988) (recovery allowed when injuries
fatal or nonfatal); WASH. REV. CODE §4.24.010 (1983) (amended to include recovery for
loss of companionship). The Illinois legislature attempted to amend the Wrongful
Death Act to allow damages for lost society; but the bill did not pass. LEGISLATIVE
SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILLINOIS,

H.B. 445 at 697 (1983).

